Trust in the Judicial System: Evidence from Brazil

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Abstract:

One issue that affects the economic and social development of a country is the ability of the judiciary to present itself as a legitimate instance in resolving conflicts that arise in the social, business and economic development. One way to measure this is through legitimacy of the motivations that lead citizens to trust or not in the Judiciary. We created the Brazilian Confidence in Justice Index (BCJI) as a validation argument for our confidence measure. The BCJI is a measure of perception, which shows the opinion of the population about Brazil's judiciary. Our results indicate that race and gender are important predictors once controlled for other characteristics of respondents. Blacks have a slightly lower level of confidence in the judiciary than whites. Women also present less confidence than men. We also show that people with low income have lower levels of trust. Our findings also have other important implications for confidence in the judicial system. We show that there is a positive and strong relationship between confidence in the judicial system and propensity to seek the judiciary.

Keywords: Trust in the judicial system, Institutions, Judiciary.

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JEL Codes: .

TRUST IN THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM: EVIDENCE FROM BRAZIL

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ABSTRACT

One issue that affects the economic and social development of a country is the ability of the judiciary to present itself as a legitimate instance in resolving conflicts that arise in the social, business and economic development. One way to measure this is through legitimacy of the motivations that lead citizens to trust or not in the Judiciary. We created the Brazilian Confidence in Justice Index (BCJI) as a validation argument for our confidence measure. The BCJI is a measure of perception, which shows the opinion of the population about Brazil's judiciary. Our results indicate that race and gender are important predictors once controlled for other characteristics of respondents. Blacks have a slightly lower level of confidence in the judiciary than whites. Women also present less confidence than men. We also show that people with low income have lower levels of trust. Our findings also have other important implications for confidence in the judicial system. We show that there is a positive and strong relationship between confidence in the judicial system and propensity to seek the judiciary.

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1. Introduction

A crucial factor in the economic and social development of a country is the ability of the judiciary to present itself as a legitimate instance for the resolution of social and economic disputes. One way to measure this is through legitimacy of the motivations that lead citizens to trust or to distrust the judiciary.

Institutions matter when transactions are costly (Coase, 1960); they provide structures through which individuals can make transactions despite uncertainty (North, 1990: 3). For North, individuals act with bounded rationality rather than the instrumental rationality. Economic agents make their choices based on incomplete information or with limited computational capacities to process information. This occurs because individuals cannot perfectly predict the circumstances under which the transactions will take place. That is, human interaction is uncertain and costly, which hampers cooperation and economic exchanges. Thus, institutions exist to reduce uncertainty as well as transaction costs "by establishing a stable structure to human interactions" (North, 1990: 6). Some institutions, however, are more efficient than others in reducing transaction costs. Institutions are not necessarily or even usually created to be socially efficient; rather they, or at least the formal rules, are created to serve the interests of those with the bargaining power to devise new rules (North, 1990: 16). Among what North calls "formal institutions", the legal institutions provide a set of rules and procedures that protect property rights and ensure economic exchanges.

The institutional infrastructure therefore fundamentally affects the political system of a country in which the rule of law exists. The judiciary is among the most important institutions in achieving and maintaining this condition (Buscaglia and Domingo, 1997). The judiciary has been a vital part of the emergence and consolidation of democracy in most Latin American countries as they moved from military and authoritarian regimes to democracy over the last two decades, mediating and resolving the disputes that arise in society, business, economy, and politics. Trust in the judiciary creates legitimacy and consolidates the rule of law (Levasseur, 2002). Measuring judicial performance is in this sense a way of measuring the effectiveness of the rule of law in a country. It is an indicator of the quality of a country's democracy (O`Donnell, 1998).

Notwithstanding an extensive literature examining trust in the judiciary in developed countries, scant attention has been devoted to emerging countries. The purpose of this study is to understand some of the determinants of public trust in the judicial system in Brazil, using a survey carried out in seven Brazilian states. It explores correlations between trust in the judicial system and a pool of demographic and economic variables such as race, income, age, gender, schooling years, previous experience with the judicial system, and knowledge about the judiciary.

We developed a measure of judicial performance in Brazil based on the motivations that drive people to trust or to distrust the country's judicial system. The result is an index of trust in the Brazilian justice, presented as a statistical summary carried out in seven Brazilian states and based on a representative sample of the population of these states. We used eleven waves of a survey via telephone interviews conducted by the São Paulo Law School of the Fundação Getulio Vargas. The sample consists of 4,685 respondents in 2010, 6,213 respondents in 2011, and 6,049 respondents in 2012.

One problem in describing public trust in the judiciary is that it is multifaceted. According to Staats, Hiskey and Bowler (2005), judicial performance is a multidimensional concept. The authors built a measure based on five dimensions: the extent of independence, accountability, efficiency, effectiveness, and accessibility. They surveyed 17 Latin American countries, interviewed legal experts, and developed a composite measure based on these five dimensions.

We approach the same problem in a different way: we assess judicial performance via the factors that lead people to trust or to distrust the judicial system. We are interested in effectiveness in terms of

expediency in deciding disputes; competence to resolve disputes (responsiveness); impartiality as a measure of accountability; independence from external political influence; and ease of use and costs as measures of access to justice. We created the Brazilian Confidence in Justice Index (BCJI) as our trust measure. The BCJI is a measure of perception; it reflects the opinion of the respondents about Brazil's judiciary.

In Brazil, the judiciary has a dual role. Sadek (2004) sees the Brazilian judiciary as both a state power and a public service provider. It acts as a state power when judging whether or not policies and actions of the executive and legislative branches of government comply with the Constitution, and it acts as a public service provider when adjudicating disputes and guaranteeing individual rights. We focus on the public service provider role of the judiciary: that is, on how effective it is in guaranteeing "justice" for individuals and business.

The results indicate that people with greater knowledge of the judicial system present higher levels of trust in the Brazilian judicial system. This conclusion, however, may in some contexts be related with the knowledge of the laws themselves rather than of the actual procedures of the judiciary. Another finding is that individuals with more schooling years (e.g., college-level education) also have a slightly higher level of trust in the judicial system. Compared to less-educated individuals, they tend to think that justice is cheaper, easier to access, more independent, honest, and competent. Our results also stress that race and gender are important predictors, once controlled for other characteristics of the respondents. Black persons have a slightly lower level of trust in the judicial system than do non-black persons, which can be explained in part by their perception that the judicial system is more expensive for and less fair to them. Compared to men, women think on one hand that the judiciary is faster, but on the other that it is less honest, accessible, inept at dispute resolution, and only somewhat independent. We find that people who have had previous experience with the judicial system report lower levels of trust. They believe that justice is more expensive and slower than do inexperienced individuals.

Finally, we analyzed the relationship between trust in the judicial system and propensity to seek the judiciary in some hypothetical situations; this may be seen as a measure of realization of such trust in terms of actually demanding the services of the judiciary. We show that there is a positive and strong relationship between trust in the judicial system and propensity to rely on the courts. This result indicates that although the judiciary has lower levels of trust according depending on some demographic and economic characteristics, people nevertheless generally see it as a legitimate way to seek solution to their problems and do not hesitate to go to court in order to resolve the disputes which arise in their daily lives.

This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses the empirical literature related to trust in the judicial system; Section 3 describes our methodology and our sample; Section 4 presents the results; and finally Section 5 presents the conclusions.

2. Literature Review

The literature indicates that a variety of factors -- including gender, race, income, years of formal schooling, and previous experience with the judiciary -- influence public trust in the courts. Lawrence (2002) presents evidence that in the United States women rely less on justice compared to men. In general, these results seem to be related with perceived violence and discrimination against women. Nomura (2010) and Brown, Moon and Zoloth (1980), for instance, show that gender-based wage discrimination is very significant in the United States labor market.

Lovell (2000) argues that women and black persons who work in São Paulo experience greater discrimination when compared to their counterparts in Bahia. In addition, Waiselfisz (2012) shows that among 84 countries Brazil has the seventh highest female murder rate. Given all this, we expect

that there are significant differences in terms of trust in the judicial system between men and women in Brazil.

Another question that emerges is whether skin color matters in terms of trust in the judical system. Sherman (2002) presents evidence that in the United States there are clear racial divisions of opinion about the criminal justice system's component institutions, though not about the system as a whole. He shows that non-black persons have twice as much trust in their local court systems than do black persons. DeLisi and Regoli (1999) show that black persons in the United States are arrested, prosecuted, convicted, and incarcerated in numbers disproportionate to their percentage of the population. For them, one explanation of this is that racial discrimination against black persons pervades the American of criminal justice system. In Brazil, black persons are more severely punished than non-black persons counterparts for committing crimes of equal or comparable severity (Adorno, 1995). Bailey, Loveman and Muniz (2013) find that racial disparities in Brazil are most severe at the upper end of the income distribution and that racial disparities in earnings are larger when race is determined by interviewers rather than self-identified.

Bennack (1999) shows that in the United States people with higher incomes and more years of formal schooling report greater trust in most of the institutions examined. Trust in the criminal justice system is generally more prevalent among younger people, those who are better educated, and those with higher incomes (Jones, Weatherburn, and McFarlane, 2008). Furthermore, people who know more about the courts are more likely to feel confident in them, as are people who have higher education levels (Benesh, 2006). In the Brazilian context, we also expect that people with higher incomes and more years of formal schooling will exhibit higher levels of trust in the Brazilian judicial system.

Salzman and Ramsey (2013) find that in Latin America previous experience with the judicial system is likely to cause more awareness of the court's deficiencies and hence probably leads to lower levels of trust in the judicial system. They also show that even in situations where a litigant achieves success in the courts, the experience with the imperfect process in a Latin American judicial system may still result in lower levels of trust relative to the inexperienced position from which the litigant began. Thus, people who have had previous experience with the judiciary may present lower levels of the trust in the judicial system when compared to people who have had no previous experience with the Brazilian judiciary.

Knowledge about the judicial system has a significant relationship with trust in the courts (Gibson et al.,1998; Benesh, 2006). In emerging economies, individuals who are better informed about the judicial system will recognize its inadequacies, which leads to lower levels of trust (Salzman and Ramsey, 2013). In this context, we expect that there is a difference between people with and people without knowledge of judiciary procedures in terms of trust in the Brazilian judicial system.

3. Methodology and Sample

Our results are based on eleven waves of a survey conducted in 2010, 2011 and 2012. This survey was performed via telephone interviews over a period of thirty-three months. The population of the survey is comprised of people distributed across the following states: Minas Gerais, Pernambuco, Rio Grande do Sul, Bahia, Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo, and the Distrito Federal, which combined represent approximately 60% of the population, according to the 2010 census conducted by the Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística (IBGE). The respondent is an individual who represents the selected household, of any gender (male or female) and aged 18 or higher.

We use a method of proportional quota sampling, using the following quotas: gender, household income, education, age, and economic status (i.e., economically active or not). The groups (strata) were proportionally distributed according to the 2010 Census and the 2009 National Household

Sample Survey[4]. Our sample consists of 4,685 respondents in 2010, 6,213 respondents in 2011, and 6,049 respondents in 2012. **Table.1** provides an overview of the sample.

Table.1 Sample Description

The sample is distributed through 7 states, which according to 2010 census data together correspond to approximately 60% of the country's population. The sample size was determined by the number of inhabitants in each state. The sampling frame was constructed so as to have a range of 95% and an absolute sampling error of 2.5%.

States	Population	Sample		
		2010	2011	2012
São Paulo	41.262.199	1694	2252	1614
Minas Gerais	19.597.330	810	1089	1164
Rio de Janeiro	15.989.929	662	867	818
Bahia	14.016.906	599	793	792
Rio Grande do Sul	10.693.929	463	609	607
Pernambuco	8.796.448	362	476	572
Distrito Federal	2.570.160	95	127	482
Total	112.926.901	4,685	6,213	6,049

Source: BCJI – São Paulo Law School – Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV)

Table.2 details the variables that control for individual's heterogeneity.

Table.2 - Definitions of Principal Variables

Woman	Dummy variable that takes value one when the respondent is female, and zero otherwise;
Black	Dummy variable that takes value one when the respondent is black, and zero otherwise;
0 to 1 Minimum Wages	Dummy variable that takes value one when the respondent's salary is between 0 and 1 minimum wages, and zero otherwise;
1 to 4 Minimum Wages	Dummy variable that takes value one when the respondent's salary is between 1 and 4 minimum wages, and zero otherwise;
4 to 8 Minimum Wages	Dummy variable that takes value one when the respondent's salary is between 4 and 8 minimum wages, and zero otherwise;
8 Minimum Wages	Dummy variable that takes value one when the respondent's salary higher than 8 minimum wages, and zero otherwise;
Age	is the respondent's age in years;
Schooling Years	is the respondent's education in years;
Had Previous Experience with the Judiciary	Dummy variable that takes value one when the respondent has had any previous experience with the judiciary, and zero otherwise;
Knowledge of the Judiciary	Dummy variable that takes value one when the respondent has knowledge of the judiciary, and zero otherwise;

Table.3 displays descriptive statistics for covariates. We have that 38% of respondents claim to trust the Federal Government and 39% of respondents have had previous experience with the judiciary. Our sample is similar to Brazilian demographic data in terms of gender and race. In our sample, 52% of respondents are female and 10% are black. The overall Brazilian population is 8% black and 51% female according to the 2010 Census. Our sample diverges somewhat from the 2010 Census in terms

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[4] Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domicílios (PNAD), is a national household sample survey that investigates every year -- and on a continuous basis -- overall population characteristics, education, labor, income and housing, among others, for different periods of time and according to the need of information about the country. Other topics such as migration, fertility are also covered.

of income. The number of households with monthly per capita income between 0 and 1 minimum wages represents 46% of our sample. For the Brazilian population as a whole the corresponding share is 54%. In our sample households with monthly per capita income between 1 and 4 minimum wages represent 37% of population. In Brazil the corresponding share is 31%. These differences can be partly explained by the fact that our sample includes some of the richest Brazilian states: São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Minas Gerais, and Rio Grande do Sul. Appendix A.2.4 displays these statistics by state.

Our sample is representative, however, for the following seven states: Minas Gerais, Pernambuco, Rio Grande do Sul, Bahia, Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo, and the Distrito Federal. Our sample data is generally similar to demographic data for these states in terms of gender and race. In terms of income, the starkest divergences occur in the cases of Bahia and Pernambuco. Households with monthly per capita income between 0 and 1 minimum wages represent 74% and 73% of the population in Bahia and Pernambuco, respectively. In our sample, these numbers are 53% and 52%, respectively.

Table.3 Descriptive Statistics for Covariates

The upper figures denote the sample average of each variable. The lower figures denote the standard deviation. Wages are measured in terms of the 2012 Minimum Wage, which corresponds to 334 dollars.

Variables	Mean (Standard Deviation)
Trust in the Federal Government	**0.388** (0.487)
Woman	**0.527** (0.499)
Black	**0.102** (0.151)
Age	**42.040** (15.637)
0 to 1 Minimum Wages	**0.462** (0.213)
1 to 4 Minimum Wages	**0.375** (0.408)
4 to 8 Minimum Wages	**0.101** (0.482)
8 or more Minimum Wages	**0.021** (0.158)
Schooling years	**9.356** (5.341)
Had Previous Experience with the Judiciary	**0.491** (0.50)
Knowledge of the judiciary	**0.796** (0.403)
Observations	16,867

The BCJI is calculated as the average from a set of nine questions covering the main aspects of confidence in the judicial system. The respondent must issue his opinion on the judicial system regarding: confidence; speed in solving conflict; cost access; ease of access; political independence; honesty; ability to solve conflicts; panorama of the last 5 years and expectation for the next 5 years. Appendix A.2.1 presents details regarding questionnaire used by the FGV Survey.

For each question, we use the weighted average of responses. For example, in order to compute

the weighted average of the first question about trust in the judicial system, we use four response categories that include: 1 = not at all confident, 2 = not very confident, 3 = fairly confident, and 4 = very confident. In order for each question to have the same weight in the index, we normalize each question so that's its value ranges from 0 to 10. The normalization is given by the ratio between the value of the response to each question and its maximum possible value. This ratio is then multiplied by 10. Thus, to compute the BCJI, we first sum the responses to all 9 questions, and then divide by 9. As each question ranges from 0 to 10, it follows that the BCJI will also range between 0 and 10. Appendix A.2.2 presents details regarding index construction. Table.4 describes the BCJI and its components.

Table.4 Description of the BCJI and its Components.

The questions that constitute the questionnaire admit either four or five responses. Each question is identified by assigning an index n to its response, which also corresponds to a value assigned to that response. Thus, the first response, i.e., the answer 0, is assigned the value 0. To the last response is assigned the maximum value, which can be either 3 or 4 depending on whether the question has four or five possible responses. The values are first normalized so as to range between 0 and 10, and then weighted according to the proportion of each question. To compute the BCJI, we first sum the weighted responses for all 9 questions, and then divide by 9.

	BCJI	*Weighted Average*			
		2010	*2011*	*2012*	*All Years*
P1	Trust	4.10	4.61	4.38	4.38
P2	Speed in Resolving Disputes	1.99	1.99	1.91	1.96
P3	Access Costs	4.62	4.61	4.80	4.68
P4	Ease of Access	2.18	2.27	2.25	2.24
P5	Political Independence	3.40	3.55	3.65	3.54
P6	Honesty	4.10	4.01	4.16	4.09
P7	Ability to Resolve Disputes	4.22	4.43	4.46	4.38
P8	Panorama of the Last 5 Years	5.91	5.86	5.85	5.87
P9	Expectation for the Next 5 Years	7.22	7.52	7.30	7.26

Source: BCJI – São Paulo Law School – Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV)

Table.5 displays the basic statistics of the BCJI for each year. Overall, the BCJI has been fairly stable between 2010 and 2012. This is natural insofar as institutional change is generally incremental rather than sudden, an accumulation of many small changes rather than occasional large changes. Institutional change over time is path-dependent because individuals learn, organizations develop, and ideologies form in the context of a particular set of formal and informal rules (North, 1990).

Although the BCJI has not dramatically changed over time, there are have occured some significant fluctuations in some demographic and economic characteristics of respondents such as race, income, age, gender, schooling years, previous experience with the justice, and knowledge about the judiciary.

Table.5 Descriptive Statistics for the BCJI

Descriptive statistics for BCJI in 2010, 2011 and 2012. The BCJI is the average of a set of nine questions covering the main aspects of trust in justice: trust (P1); speed in resolving disputes (P2); access cost (P3); ease of access (P4); political independence (P5); honesty (P6); ability to resolve disputes (P7); panorama of the last 5 years (P8); and expectation for the next 5 years (P9).

Weighted Average	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.
	2010		
4.19	1.24	0.25	8.70
	2011		
4.29	1.31	0.25	9.07
	2012		
4.31	1.30	0.25	9.35
	All Years		
4.27	1.29	0.25	9.35

Source: BCJI – São Paulo Law School – Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV)

Figure.1 is a histogram showing the overall variation in trust in the judicial system for the 16,867 respondents in our sample. As can be seen, the distribution of BCJI scores is reasonably symmetric and close to normal.

Figure.1 Distribution of the *BCJI*

This histogram shows the fraction of respondents with Brazilian Confidence in Justice Index (BCJI) scores in the shown ranges. Sample = 16,867 respondents. Mean = 4.27, standard deviation =1.29, and median = 4.25.


Table.6 provides Pearson correlation coefficients between the BCJI and its component questions. In all sample years, the BCJI correlates positively with each question, with coefficients ranging from 0.41 to 0.64. Part of this correlation is by construction, because each question is a part of the BCJI. The correlations between questions are generally positive and statistically significant but moderate. The correlation is high for some questions like trust, access cost, and honesty, but only moderate -- between -0.02 and 0.35 -- for the other questions. This suggests that, except for trust, access cost, and honesty, colinearity between the questions and the BCJI should not be a big problem.

Table.6 Correlations

Correlations between the Brazilian Confidence in Justice Index (BCJI) and its components for all three years. Significant coefficients, at 5% or less, are in **boldface.**

	BCJI	P1	P2	P3	P4	P5	P6	P7	P8
BCJI	**1**								
P1	**0.64***	**1**							
P2	**0.45***	**0.24***	**1**						
P3	**0.63***	**0.45***	**0.22***	**1**					
P4	**0.41***	**0.14***	**0.14***	**0.13***	**1**				
P5	**0.52***	**0.21***	**0.15***	**0.22***	**0.24***	**1**			
P6	**0.62***	**0.43***	**0.19***	**0.43***	**0.13***	**0.20***	**1**		
P7	**0.44***	**0.16***	**0.10***	**0.16***	**0.04***	**0.10***	**0.20***	**1**	
P8	**0.58***	**0.28***	**0.19***	**0.29***	**0.11***	**0.18***	**0.27***	**0.12***	**1**
P9	**0.49***	**0.20***	**0.11***	**0.19***	**0.06***	**0.10***	**0.18***	**0.10***	**0.35***

To shed some light on the drivers for individual trust in the judicial system we adjusted a model including demographic and economic variables by running Pooled Ordinary Least Squares (Pooled OLS) regressions. The BCJI for respondent i in period t ($BCJI_{i,t}$) is modeled as:

$$BCJI_{i,t} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 Trust\ in\ the\ Federal\ Government_{i,t} + \beta_2 gender_i + \beta_3 race_i + \beta_4 age_{i,t}$$
$$+ \beta_5 age^2_{i,t} + \beta_6 income_{i,t} + \beta_7 schooling\ years_{i,t} + \beta_8 experience_{i,t}$$
$$+ \beta_9 knowledge_{i,t} + \delta' x'_{i,t} + \varepsilon_{i,t} \quad (1)$$

Many personal characteristics are potentially associated with trust in the judiciary. We therefore included also an additional set of control variables, such as state, quarter, employment, and marital status dummies (included in $x'_{i,t}$, which is a column vector of control variables).

In order to examine the relationship between these features and the questions of BCJI, we ran Pooled OLS *for each question*.

$$P1_{i,t} = \gamma_0 + \gamma_1 Trust\ in\ the\ Federal\ Government_{i,t} + \gamma_2 gender_i + \gamma_3 * race_i + \gamma_4 age_{i,t}$$
$$+ \gamma_5 age^2_{i,t} + \gamma_6 income_{i,t} + \gamma_7 schooling\ years_{i,t} + \gamma_8 experience_{i,t}$$
$$+ \gamma_9 knowledge_{i,t} + \gamma'_{10} x'_{i,t} + \varepsilon_{i,t} \quad (2)$$

$$P2_{i,t} = \delta_0 + \delta_1 Trust\ in\ the\ Federal\ Government_{i,t} + \delta_2 gender_i + \delta_3 race_i + \delta_4 age_{i,t}$$
$$+ \delta_5 age^2_{i,t} + \delta_6 income_{i,t} + \delta_7 schooling\ years_{i,t} + \delta_8 experience_{i,t}$$
$$+ \delta_9 knowledge_{i,t} + \delta'_{10} x'_{i,t} + \varepsilon_{i,t} \quad (3)$$

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$$P9_{i,t} = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 Trust\ in\ the\ Federal\ Government_{i,t} + \alpha_2 gender_i + \alpha_3 * race_i + \alpha_4 age_{i,t}$$
$$+ \alpha_5 age^2_{i,t} + \alpha_6 income_{i,t} + \alpha_7 schooling\ years_{i,t} + \alpha_8 experience_{i,t}$$
$$+ \alpha_9 knowledge_{i,t} + \alpha'_{10} x'_{i,t} + \varepsilon_{i,t} \quad (4)$$

Where *P1, P2, P3,…, P9* represent each question of the BCJI.

4. Empirical Results

4.1. Trust in the Judicial System

Regression analysis was used to examine the influence of gender, race, income, schooling years, previous experience with the judiciary, and knowledge about the judiciary on public trust in the judicial system.

Table.7 shows that trust in the judicial system varies widely among these groups. Women trust the judiciary less than men do. The results obtained via Pooled OLS indicate that the levels of trust in the judiciary of women are 12 basis points lower (with significance at the 1% level) than those of men. Compared to men, they see the judiciary as less honest, faster, only somewhat independent, more difficult to access, and less effective little in resolving disputes.

These results are similar to Lawrence (2002) and may be explained in part by two aspects: discrimination and violence against women. Brazil has the seventh highest female murder rate among the 84 countries examined by Waiselfisz (2012). He shows that the murder rate in Brazil was roughly 4.4 victims for every 100,000 women. Physical violence is prevalent, comprising 44.2% of cases. The share of psychological or moral harassment is higher than 20%, and 12.2% of victims are sexually assaulted. Some studies also show that significant discrimination exists within the Brazilian labor market. Lovell (2000) argues that women and black persons who work in São Paulo experience greater discrimination than their counterparts in Bahia.

Race is also an important predictor of citizens' trust in the judicial system. We find that black persons have lower levels of trust in the judicial system than do non-black persons. The results indicate that the levels of trust of black persons in the judiciary are 4.8 basis points lower than those of non-black persons (with significance at the 10% level). Compared to non-black persons, black persons see the judiciary as more expensive and less honest.

The regression outputs also are consistent with the literature that documents these racial disparities. Some studies show that minority group members are more distrustful and less confident in the police and the courts (Huang and Vaughn, 1996; Lasley, 1994; Schumann, Steeh, Bobo, and Krysan, 1997). These minority concerns are largely fueled by issues of racial profiling (Cole, 1999; Kennedy, 1997).

One way to interpret these results is that they reflect black persons' perception of the legitimacy of the laws. That is, they tend to have seen the rules themselves as biased. Additionally, some studies show that black Brazilians suffer significant discrimination. Twine (1998), Reichmann (1999), Burdick (1998), Sheriff (2000), and Bailey, Loveman and Muniz (2013) have provided some evidence of racism experienced by black Brazilians. Furthermore, according to the MNDH (Movimento Nacional de Direitos Humanos) the federal police apparatus killed three times more black persons than non-black persons in 1997.

The BCJI results regarding the question of trust in the judiciary show that people with high incomes have higher levels of trust in the judicial system. They regard Brazilian justice as more politically independent, less expensive, and easier to access than do lower-income Brazilians. These results are consistent with the literature that suggests that richer or more powerful individuals are treated differently than those without such resources (Bennack, 1999).

We also obtained evidence that people with more years of formal schooling exhibit higher levels of trust in the judicial system. The coefficient implies that a one year of additional formal schooling predicts a 0.71 basis point increase (statistically significant at the 1% level) in the BCJI. Our results suggest that as schooling increases, then so do the perceptions of legal costs, political independence, and honesty of the judiciary, although the perception of its ability to resolve disputes decreases. Jones, Weatherburn, and McFarlane (2008) present evidence that trust in the criminal justice system is generally more prevalent among younger people, among those who are better educated, and among those with higher incomes. They also found that respondents who earned higher annual incomes were more confident that the judicial system is effective in bringing people to the courts, meeting the needs of victims, respecting the rights of the accused, and treating the accused fairly. Benesh (2006) also shows that people who reported that they knew more about the courts were more likely to trust them, as were people who had higher levels of schooling.

In terms of experience with the judiciary, our results indicate that people who have had previous experience present levels of trust 11.07 basis points lower than people who have had no previous experience with the judiciary (with significance at the 1% level). For these respondents, although the judiciary is more politically independent and easily accessible, it is also slower and more expensive when compared to people who have had no previous experience with the judiciary. These results are similar to those of Salzman and Ramsey (2013).

Finally, we found that people with greater knowledge of the judiciary trust it more. These results indicate that people with knowledge about the judiciary present 17.36 basis points higher levels of trust (with significance at the 10% level). Nonetheless, these findings may relate to knowledge of the law itself, as opposed to of the *procedures* of the judicial system. Furthermore, these results are consistent with Gibson et al. (1998) and Benesh (2006), who present evidence that knowledge about the judicial system has a significant relationship with trust in the courts.

Table.7 Determinants of the BCJI - Pooled OLS Regression

In column (1) the dependent variable is the BCJI, which has a range between 0 and 10. It is the average of a set of nine questions covering the main aspects of trust in the judicial system. In columns (2), (3), …, (10), we set out the questions used in the BCJI, where the respondent is required to issue his or her opinion on the judicial system regarding: trust (2) ; speed in resolving disputes (3); access cost (4); ease of access (5); political independence (6); honesty (7); ability to resolve disputes (8); panorama of the last 5 years (5); and expectation for the next 5 years (10).

| | BCJI | Questions used in the BCJI | | | | | | | | |
| | | Trust | Speed in Resolving Disputes | Access Costs | Ease of Access | Political Independence | Honesty | Ability to Resolve Disputes | Panorama of the Last 5 Years | Expectation for the Next 5 Years |
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Trust in the Federal Government	**0.7870***	**0.3504***	**0.1992***	**0.3054***	**0.0627***	**0.1671***	**0.3531***	**0.1814***	**0.3865***	**0.3507***
	(40.58)	(32.35)	(15.87)	(28.50)	(5.22)	(12.47)	(30.98)	(12.97)	(25.05)	(22.09)
Woman	**-0.1205***	**-0.0365***	**0.0466***	-0.0133	**-0.1210***	**-0.0794***	**-0.0505***	**-0.0605***	**-0.0981***	**0.0505***
	(-6.15)	(-3.34)	(3.70)	(-1.23)	(-9.94)	(-5.92)	(-4.42)	(-4.25)	(-6.32)	(3.07)
Black	**-0.0482***	**-0.0386****	-0.0200	**-0.0413***	0.0035	0.0054	**-0.0480***	-0.0156	**0.0432***	0.0094
	(-1.68)	(-2.40)	(-1.13)	(-2.62)	(0.20)	(0.28)	(-2.87)	(-0.74)	(1.86)	(0.39)
Age	**-0.0224***	**-0.0044****	**-0.0148***	**-0.0088***	**-0.0109***	**-0.0203***	**0.0043****	**-0.0051****	**-0.0070****	**0.0064****
	(-6.29)	(-2.14)	(-6.30)	(-4.45)	(-5.13)	(-8.52)	(2.07)	(-1.99)	(-2.47)	(2.12)
Age Squared	**0.0002***	0.0000	**0.0001***	**0.0001***	**0.0000****	**0.0001***	**-0.0000***	0.0000	0.0000	**-0.0001***
	(3.89)	(1.06)	(3.68)	(3.70)	(2.11)	(4.84)	(-1.85)	(1.06)	(0.72)	(-2.85)
1 to 4 Minimum Wages	-0.0284	0.0291	0.0060	0.0054	0.0226	0.0199	-0.0379	-0.0418	0.0386	-0.0362
	(-0.66)	(1.15)	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.84)	(0.69)	(-1.41)	(-1.28)	(1.08)	(-0.97)
4 to 8 Minimum Wages	0.0103	**0.0573****	-0.0116	0.0373	**0.0652****	**0.0723****	-0.0262	-0.0488	0.0272	**-0.0234**
	(0.24)	(2.32)	(-0.41)	(1.52)	(2.46)	(2.53)	(-1.00)	(-1.54)	(0.78)	(-0.64)
8 or More Minimum Wages	0.0378	**0.0780***	-0.0235	**0.0616****	**0.0648****	**0.0779***	-0.0105	-0.0520	0.0372	**-0.0794****
	(0.86)	(3.05)	(-0.81)	(2.41)	(2.37)	(2.61)	(-0.39)	(-1.58)	(1.03)	(-2.10)
Schooling Years	**0.0071***	**0.0123***	**-0.0042***	**0.0093***	0.0020	**0.0031****	**0.0076***	**-0.0063***	0.0012	**-0.0051***
	(3.49)	(11.04)	(-3.30)	(8.30)	(1.60)	(2.25)	(6.57)	(-4.38)	(0.72)	(-2.99)
Previous Experience with the Judiciary	**-0.1107***	**-0.0291***	**-0.1187***	**-0.0610***	**0.0813***	**0.0731***	-0.0142	0.0015	**-0.0838***	**-0.0715***
	(-5.76)	(-2.74)	(-9.73)	(-5.78)	(6.86)	(5.59)	(-1.28)	(0.10)	(-5.46)	(-4.42)
Knowledge of the Judiciary	**0.1736***	**0.0939***	-0.0017	**0.0696***	**0.1044***	**0.1525***	**0.0750***	**0.0673***	**0.0790***	**0.0695***
	(7.05)	(6.58)	(-0.11)	(4.86)	(6.95)	(9.08)	(5.05)	(3.67)	(3.96)	(3.24)
Constant	**4.7446***	**2.1892***	**2.2934***	**2.4445***	**1.7842***	**2.5472***	**2.0722***	**2.3672***	**3.4497***	**3.6477***
	(52.15)	(42.55)	(38.20)	(48.33)	(32.16)	(41.50)	(38.62)	(36.05)	(48.48)	(48.81)
Observations	16,867	16,867	16,867	16,867	16,867	16,867	16,867	16,867	16,867	16,867
Adjusted R-squared	0.1154	0.1020	0.0356	0.0653	0.0415	0.0625	0.0695	0.0163	0.0534	0.0342

Notes: 1) The control variables are state, quarter dummies, formal contract work and marital state. 2) T-statistics (heteroskedasticity-consistent for cross-sectional OLS) are in parentheses. *, **, and *** respectively indicate significance levels the at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. Significant results (at 10% level or better) are in boldface.

4.2.Confidence in the Judicial System and Propensity to seek the Judiciary

We also assessed the relationship between trust in the judicial system and propensity to resort to the judiciary in six hypothetical situations. The ensuing behavior index was based on a set of questions whereby respondents stated how likely it is that they would resort to the judiciary to resolve a hyphotetical dispute or problem. The possible answers to those questions being: (i) definitely not, (ii) probably not, (iii) probably yes, and (iv) definitely yes. The behavior index is thus a measure of the population's perception of their own propensity to use the court system. Appendix A.2.3 presents details regarding index construction.

The index is built on cases concerning family issues (C1), provision of service issues (C2), consumer issues (C3), neighborhood issues (C4), labor disputes (C5), and a case involving the government (C6). We also took into account situations in which people from very different income levels and social groups share the same experience, as well as hypothetical scenarios in which the respondents were asked to imagine themselves on different sides in the dispute. At one juncture, for instance, the respondent plays the role of the consumer, with a weaker position, whereas in another scenario the interviewee is the service provider, having thus a stronger position.

Analogously to equation (1), we adjusted a model including demographic and economic variables to shed some light on drivers for the Behavior Index. We ran Pooled Ordinary Least Squares (Pooled OLS) regressions. The Behavior Index for the respondent i that was surveyed in the period t ($Behavior\ Index_{i,t}$) is modeled as:

$$Behavior\ Index_{i,t} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 BCJI_{i,t} + \beta_2 Trust\ in\ the\ Federal\ Government_{i,t} + \beta_3 gender_i + \beta_4 race_i + \beta_5 age_{i,t} + \beta_6 age^2_{i,t} + \beta_7 income_{i,t} + \beta_8 schooling\ years_{i,t} + \beta_9 experience_{i,t} + \beta_{10} knowledge_{i,t} + \delta'\ x'_{i,t} + \varepsilon_{i,t}\ (5)$$

We included also an additional set of control variables, such as state, quarter, employment, and marital status dummies (included in $x'_{i,t}$, which is a column vector of control variables).

Table.8 shows a positive relationship between trust in the judicial system and the behavior index, in clear support of our hypothesis that people with higher levels of trust in the judicial system have a higher propensity to resort to the judiciary. Hence, our behavior index is more adequately termed the "trust realization index". The Pooled OLS coefficient implies that a one unit increase in the BCJI predicts a 7.8 basis point increase in the behavior index (with significance at the 1% level). In general, people have a higher propensity to seek the judiciary in cases concerning family issues, neighborhood issues, labor disputes, and cases involving the government. Underlying this result is the fact that the respondents see the justice system as a legitimate stage for the resolution of their disputes.

Our results also show that there is a positive and statically significant correlation between the behavior index and some demographic and economic variables such as being female, being black, age, schooling years, previous experience with the judiciary, and knowledge about the justice court system. Our estimations indicate that although the judiciary has lower levels of the trust for some demographic and economic variables, most Brazilians perceive it as a legitimate way to seek solutions to their problems and would not hesitate to go to court to solve them. For example,

although women generally have lowers levels of trust in the judicial system than men, they are more likely to seek the judiciary for family, labor, and service issues, but less likely to seek it for consumer issues. We find similar results regarding age and previous experience with the judiciary. These results are statistically significant at the 1% level.

Lambsdorff (1999) argues that the keys to less corruption and greater trust are an effective system of property rights and the rule of law. If the law is enforced on fair grounds, then people will be more likely to obey the law and to trust the judicial system. In contrast, if people feel that they are treated unfairly, then they will rely less the courts and will be less likely to obey the laws. Higher-trusting societies have better governance and faster economic growth. They also spend more on redistribution and have greater respect for the law (Uslaner, 2002).

Table.8 Determinants of the Behavior Index – Pooled OLS Regression

In column (1) the dependent variable is the Behavior Index, which ranges between 0 and 10. It is based on a set of six questions whereby respondents stated how likely they would be to resort to the judiciary to resolve a dispute or problem, the possible answers to those questions being: (i) definitely not, (ii) probably not, (iii) probably yes, and (iv) definitely yes. The behavior index is thus a measure of the population's perception of its own propensity to go to court to resolve disputes. In columns (2), (3), …, (7), we set out the hypothetical questions used in the Behavior Index, such as cases concerning family issues (2), provision of service (3), consumer issues (4), neighborhood issues (5), labor disputes (6) and a case involving the government (7).

| | Behavior Index | Questions used in the Behavior Index | | | | | |
| | | Family Issues | Provision of Service | Consumer Issues | Neighborhood | Labor | Government |
	(1)	*(2)*	*(3)*	*(4)*	*(5)*	*(6)*	*(7)*
BCJI	**0.0780***	**0.0446***	0.0099	0.0110	**0.0328***	**0.0240***	**0.0256***
	(7.20)	(7.75)	(1.53)	(1.09)	(5.06)	(3.85)	(4.78)
Trust in the Government	0.0239	0.0090	0.0067	0.0307	0.0239	0.0061	0.0096
	(0.92)	(0.64)	(0.41)	(1.09)	(1.45)	(0.39)	(0.74)
Female	**0.1930***	**0.3818***	**0.0819***	0.0241	**-0.0576***	**-0.0411***	-0.0163
	(7.69)	(27.86)	(5.19)	(0.93)	(-3.67)	(-2.72)	(-1.30)
Black	**0.0949***	-0.0049	**0.0400***	0.0507	**0.0867***	0.0013	**0.0393****
	(2.62)	(-0.25)	(1.77)	(1.02)	(3.91)	(0.06)	(2.18)
Age	**0.0256***	**0.0072***	**0.0152***	**0.0137***	**0.0176***	0.0014	**0.0060****
	(5.24)	(2.73)	(5.13)	(4.84)	(5.95)	(0.48)	(2.52)
Age Squared	**-0.0004***	**-0.0002***	**-0.0002***	**-0.0002***	**-0.0002***	-0.0000	**-0.0001***
	(-6.99)	(-5.31)	(-6.82)	(-5.22)	(-6.21)	(-1.32)	(-3.39)
1 to 4 Minimum Wages	0.0738	**0.0551***	0.0168	**0.0505***	0.0359	0.0090	0.0188
	(1.17)	(1.65)	(0.44)	(1.75)	(0.91)	(0.24)	(0.59)
4 to 8 Minimum Wages	**0.1351****	**0.1036***	0.0322	**0.0650***	0.0348	0.0139	**0.0655****
	(2.21)	(3.21)	(0.87)	(1.67)	(0.91)	(0.38)	(2.12)
More than 8 Minimum wages	0.0979	**0.1085***	-0.0160	0.0583	0.0226	0.0306	0.0339
	(1.55)	(3.27)	(-0.42)	(1.29)	(0.57)	(0.82)	(1.06)
Schooling Years	**0.0114***	**0.0094***	-0.0010	-0.0016	**0.0039****	**0.0065***	0.0016
	(4.58)	(7.20)	(-0.61)	(-0.92)	(2.47)	(4.29)	(1.27)
Previous Experience with the Judiciary	**0.1644***	**0.0610***	0.0174	0.0204	**0.0892***	**0.0887***	**0.0446***
	(6.83)	(4.69)	(1.13)	(0.86)	(5.80)	(6.01)	(3.69)
Knowledge of the Judiciary	**0.2197***	**0.1059***	**0.0570***	**0.0559***	**0.0950***	**0.0951***	**0.0546***
	(6.32)	(5.56)	(2.71)	(2.59)	(4.42)	(4.53)	(3.17)
Constant	**5.8826***	**3.0057***	**2.9872***	**3.2713***	**2.7576***	**3.3194***	**3.3899***
	(45.81)	(43.78)	(37.29)	(45.18)	(34.25)	(43.50)	(52.81)
Observations	16,867	16,867	16,867	16,867	16,867	16,867	16,867
Adjusted R-squared	0.0445	0.0883	0.0183	0.0023	0.0149	0.0223	0.0124

Notes: 1) The table shows the coefficients of the pooled OLS for indicated regressions of hypothetical situations of disputes on personal features and control variables. 2) The control variables are state, year, formal contract work dummy, and marital state dummy. 3) T-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, and *** respectively indicate significance levels at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. 4) Significant results (at 10% level or better) are in **boldface.**

Finally, we also studied the connection between trust in the judicial system and willingness to go to court by applying pseudo-panel techniques to available cross-sectional data. Recently pseudo-panel methods have been used to overcome some of the known limitations of cross sectional data; they allow for example to control for unobservable characteristics of survey

respondents.

Our pseudo-panel builds on the same waves of the survey conducted in 2010, 2011 and 2012. We draw largely on the methodology set forth by Verbeek and Vella (2005) and Verbeek (2007) to determine the sizes of the cohorts as well as the variables chosen to construct the cohorts. Our cohorts are based on the ages and the years of education of the respondents. Verbeek (2007) argues that suitably choosing these variables is essential for maintaining the asymptotic properties of the pseudo-panel. Our cohorts partition the ages of the respondents into five-year intervals, including only individuals aged between 18 and 72. We select the following 7 groups according to schooling years: 0-3 years, 4 years, 5-7 years, 8 years, 9-10 years, 11 years, and 12 years or more. After defining the cohorts, a set of other variables is combined into the dataset, including a pool of demographic and economic variables such as race, income, age, gender, schooling years, and all questions related to the main aspects of trust in the judicial system. Based on this data structure we generate the pseudo-panels by averaging all variables at the cohort level.

Our pseudo-panel is formed creating synthetic observations obtained from averaging real observations with similar characteristics in a sequence of repeated cross sectional data sets. In this way, the synthetic units of observations can be thought as being "followed" over time. The model then requires an appropriate modification:

$$\overline{Behavior\ Index}_{c,t} = \bar{\alpha}_c + \beta_1 * \overline{BCJI}_{c,t} + \delta' * \bar{x}'_{c,t} + \bar{u}_{c,t}, \quad c=1,...,C, \quad t=1,...,T. \qquad (6)$$

where the individual index, i, has been replaced by a cohort index, c and $\bar{\alpha}_c$ is the fixed effect parameter. Analogously to equation (5), the slope β_1 is the parameter of interest and $\bar{x}'_{c,t}$ is a vector of control variables.

Figure.2 shows the cohort sizes. We have 77 cohorts with an average of 219 and a median of 189 observations per cohort. The minimum and maximum cohort values are 21 and 921, respectively.

Figure.2 Cohort Sizes

Table.9 lays out the basic descriptive statistics of the pseudo-panel for all questions and demographic and economic variables of the constructed cohorts. The average BCJI in 2010 was 4.17. It jumped to 4.28 in 2011 and then slightly increased to 4.31 in 2012. So overall the BCJI has not changed much over time. This result is due to the low variation among the answers to the questions that constitute the index. Something similar happened with the behavior index: its average in 2010 was 6.95, then increased to 7.08 in 2011, and then decreased to 7.00 in 2012.

Table.9 Descriptive Statistics of the Variables in the Pseudo-Panel

	2010		2011		2012	
Variables	Mean	Std. Dev.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Mean	Std. Dev.
BCJI	4.17	0.21	4.28	0.20	4.31	0.31
Trust	4.08	0.44	4.63	0.46	4.30	0.51
Speed in Resolving Disputes	1.93	0.38	1.97	0.36	1.95	0.44
Access Costs	4.58	0.41	4.58	0.37	4.81	0.55
Ease of Access	2.12	0.47	2.21	0.45	2.14	0.49
Political Independence	3.33	0.56	3.49	0.54	3.55	0.69
Honesty	4.11	0.39	4.12	0.63	4.21	0.48
Ability to Resolve Disputes	4.24	0.42	4.49	0.63	4.64	0.54
Panorama of the Last 5 Years	5.90	0.32	5.82	0.37	5.89	0.59
Expectation for the Next 5 Years	7.24	0.37	7.25	0.37	7.35	0.60
Behavior Index	6.95	0.38	7.08	0.29	7.00	0.34
Family Issues	8.59	0.75	8.75	0.58	8.57	0.76
Provision of Service	7.93	0.68	8.09	0.65	8.03	0.63
Consumer Issues	0.28	0.03	0.27	0.02	0.27	0.01
Neighborhood Issues	7.84	0.60	8.15	0.62	8.08	0.71
Labor Disputes	8.28	0.56	8.35	0.50	8.25	0.59
Government Issues	8.78	0.47	8.86	0.39	8.80	0.42

Table.10 reinforces our previous findings as to a positive connection between trust and its practical realization. The coefficient of the BCJI is positive and statistically strong. The RE coefficient implies that a one unit increase in the BCJI predicts a 30 basis point increase in the behavior index (with significance at the 1% level). When controlled for unobserved effects of each cohort (FE) this coefficient is lower, but still statistically significant at the 5% level.

Table.10 Determinants of the Behavior Index: Pseudo-Panel

BCJI	Random Effects				Fixed Effects			
	0.317***	0.322***	0.310***	0.300***	0.234**	0.258***	0.235**	0.236**
	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.10)
Covariates	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year Dummies		Y		Y		Y		Y
State Dummies			Y	Y			Y	Y
Constant	4.908***	4.648***	3.605***	3.658***	5.093***	4.565***	4.624***	4.670***
	(0.54)	(0.58)	(0.69)	(0.70)	(0.69)	(0.73)	(0.93)	(0.91)
Observations	231	231	231	231	231	231	231	231
Median RE λ	0.41	0.38	0.30	0.31				
R-squared					0.192	0.237	0.254	0.270

Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

5. Conclusion

This paper relies on a series of waves of the FGV survey to provide further insight into the determinants of the various degrees of trust in the judicial system in Brazil over 2010-2012, as well as into their implications in terms of actual resort to the judicial system. We develop a measure of judicial performance in Brazil that is based on the motivations behind people's trust or distrust on the country's judicial system. The resulting index performs well as a measure of the population´s views on the reliability of the Brazilian justice system.

Our findings support the view that race and gender are important predictors once controlled for other characteristics of respondents. Black persons and women have a slightly lower level of trust in the judicial system. People who have had previous experience with the judiciary also tend to trust the judicial system less. On the other hand, better-educated individuals and individuals better acquainted with the judicial system trust it more. In particular, our results show that a highly educated individual with some understanding of the judicial system – and consequently heightened deference towards governmental institutions – will have the highest levels of trust in the judicial system. On the other extreme, the lowest levels of trust are exhibited by persons who have been less exposed to formal education, who are female, who are black, and who are skeptical about government institutions. These results are quite intuitive and confirm some interesting notions about what drives trust in the judicial system. In present days it is essential that the judicial system consider carefully what drives support for its institutions.

In addition to the abovementioned conclusions, we also found evidence of a positive relationship between trust in the judicial system and the behavior index (the "trust realization index"), the latter being a measure of people's perception about their propensity to actually go to court to resolve their disputes. That is, people who have higher levels of trust in the judicial system are more likely to use its services. We determined furthermore that being female, being black, being older, being better educated, having previous experience with the judiciary, and being knowledgeable about the court system are all positively correlated with the trust realization index. Somewhat surprisingly, although these people have lower levels of trust in the judiciary, they are more likely to seek the judiciary in some hypothetical situations such as cases concerning family issues,

provision of service issues, consumer issues, neighborhood issues, labor disputes, and cases involving the government. Despite their misgivings about the judicial system these people do perceive it as a legitimate venue for seeking solutions to their problems and do not hesitate to go to court in order to solve disputes.

Finally, our findings point to other important implications of trust in the judicial system. Given that black persons and women exhibit lower levels of the trust, efforts should be made to reduce costs of judicial services, thus entailing greater access to the judicial system as well as a greater sense of fairness. Our findings also show that people with low income have lower levels of the trust in the judicial system. Nonetheless, our results should be viewed as provisory conclusions of an empirical analysis on some of the determinants of trust in the Brazilian judicial system. Further and more accurate estimates and measures of trust institutional are needed if we truly want to better tackle the influence of other aspects on trust in the judicial system.

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