


**CLASSES, CAPITAL AND THE
SOCIAL FORMS IN BETWEEN -
On the political and
intellectual organization of the
contradiction**

LEONARDO FERREIRA GUIMARÃES



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Abstract:

This working paper focusses on a rigorous and somewhat idiosyncratic exposition of the concepts of dialectics, determinations of reflection (or essentialities) and social forms, adopting a Marxist reading of Hegel's Science of Logic. The objective of this focus is to address one of the elements highly common in debates between Marxists and post-structuralists e amongst Marxist themselves: the centrality of categories of the one (like Universality, necessity, identity and so on) or of the multiple (like particularity, contingency, difference etc). Hence, the focus of this work is on the centrality of reflexive or mutual determinations (essence, non-identical identity, contradictory unity and social forms). Initially, even though Marx and some Marxist authors had used the notion of social forms, none of them had this notion developed in itself. The specific developments of this notion: such as the value forms, commodity form, political and juridical social forms were explored by various authors and by Marx himself. But, in the literature review made for this research, it wasn't found any conceptualization of the general notion. The concept of social form can be explored as a methodological resource to mediate those above-mentioned elements of the debates. For instance, to centralize the social forms is to centralize the negative and reflexive element when we discuss if it's the capital and its tendency laws that make for the historical march or the class struggle and the political contingency. The focus is on the something that exists in-between, the objectivation process in itself, not in its extremes.

Keywords: Dialectics; Marxist method; Social Forms; Political Economy; Hegel-Marxrelation.

JEL Codes: B40; B49; B51.

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Introduction

This presentation starts with a contextualization of the 2017 Historical Materialism Australasia conference in which it was presented. In sequence, it punctuates some contextualization of contemporary capitalism and its relationship with the problems of Universality, Particularity, Unity, Identity and difference, necessity and contingency. The purpose of doing so is to present the necessity of discussing the dialectics and its usage, having in mind the precision of categories and concepts as a way to approach real problems of contemporaneity. Hence, the next step is to explore the categories of Hegelian dialectics, in a Marxist approach and to build precisely and rigorously the concept of social forms. By the end of this presentation, a group of methodological procedures is suggested as a specific, non-dogmatic and materialistic dialectical instrument of analysis.

The Historical Materialism Australasia 2017 presentations were punctuated with a lot of angst over the contemporary conditions and contradictions. Drew Cottle and Angela Keys exposed the connections between the military industrial complex, the power relations and the money; Bill Dunn the contradictory diversity of the Marxists writings on money; I-Yi Hsieh versed on the neoliberalism with Chinese characteristics; Cameron Smith about the contradictory relations between multiculturalism and the authoritarian technologies on borders of Australia; Toby Rogers on the production of an autism epidemic by the science, the pharmaceutical and agricultural industries and Samuel Russel and Nathalie Jaques about resistance and disruption on capital movements. It is possible to understand that all as a symptom of our times.

The capitalism is going through a radical time of change, it is impossible to know what is coming out of it. Nevertheless, it is possible to say that we are seeing something like the renaissance of modern thought, of Universal concerns and Universal emancipation slogans. And now the notion of universality is bigger and wider than before. The Universal subject – according to Marx, “a sphere which has a universal character by its universal suffering and claims no particular right because no particular wrong, but wrong generally, is perpetuated against it”^[1] – still is proletarian - but also bisexual, female, lesbian, trans, gay, with disabilities, black, Asiatic, African, Latin-American, from prosecuted religions and ethnic groups as well as services industries and technology.

In the contemporary capitalism it is necessary to have in mind that the invasion of the bodies, the oppression and the restraining of the most basic freedoms (like the freedom to say no for slave-like conditions and for sex) are a threat to what is considered Universally as humanity. This suffering is a Universal one, even though it is perpetrated against particular groups of human beings.

Even though the so-called minorities are not Universal in a Hegelian sense, they have, as humans, general needs menaced by their condition. The modern human-rights principles, are generally violated in these existences. As Marx pointed out in the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right, as quoted above, the universal subject is the one that has Universal needs. Hence, these can be Universal subjects in a revolutionary sense.

Subjectively, academically and artistically, some these changes in the capitalistic ideologies over Universality, Particularity, Unity and Differences can be related to the post-structuralist thinkers and the post-modern authors and artists. The period of capitalism between the late 1960's and the 2008 crisis were marked by a form of negation of Universality that composes with what we can, today, call the resurgent Universality.

The work and thought of those post-modern/structuralists intellectuals, activists and artists resonate within the left-wing social movements and political parties. The leftist anticommunism emergency and the rejection of socialist revolutions can be linked with 1956 exposure of Stalin's crimes by Khrushchev. The connection between communism and authoritarianism and the sayings that one ought not to repeat the Stalin's deviations were rapidly appropriated by the capitalistic ideology as a leftist cooptation discourse.

Those changes borne fear and rejection of universal thought and struggle, of socialism and communism as a field of action and a repugnance of parties with communist, socialist and worker on their names and histories. As a consequence, the Marxists and communists intellectuals, activists and politicians tend to be adversaries of the post-modern/structuralists. That way, an abyss divided the leftists projects of society.

But this field of action failed too. The social movements related to urban and minorities causes as well as other particular struggles were coopted by the capital. The cooptation usually as accompanied by the creation of a market niche intended for the formerly rebellious groups. Those markets usually are urban, specialized, more expensive and sometimes inaccessible for the social base of their own original movement.

After the 2008 crisis explosion, the capitalism was again being called capitalism by the media and mainstream analysts. The euphemisms pointed out by Luc Boltansky and Eve Chiapello at their book *New Spirit of Capitalism* are no longer the only acceptable name for the capitalistic mode of production. Socialism and communism are growing larger in people's speeches and in the social movements. The old socialists and communists parties that avoided the Eurocommunism wave are seeing their affiliates numbers grow larger and new socialists parties are being created and becoming expressive. Those are some of the bias of the "renaissance of modernity" that is analyzed here. However, as a response, the fascism is growing too.

Having the above aspects in consideration, we can state that the main point of this presentation is to offer ways by which we can rigorously think about the Universalities without losing track of the Particularities, as our times demand.

After the above-mentioned movement of the rejection of Universality, it returned to the political and theoretical discourses. But, not as it was broadly perceived before. The sublation (*Aufhebung*) process includes suspensions of some of the consolidated determinities of the *thing in itself* (in this case, the Universality) in its past form. The dogmatism that was present in the Communist Party of Soviet Union Materialistic Dialectics is no longer accepted at the more avantgarde authors.

As Jordan Ednay also pointed out at this conference, the Universality with a dogmatic approach ought to be avoided. In its place, one should look after a Universality concept that passes (*ubergehen*) itself in the midst of particularities and minorities claim. In some of the discourses, authors, activists and artists may not even be clear of the universality of their own questions. But, it is there again, as we can see in the slogans of interseccionalidad and consubstancialidad of gender movements, for instance.

The Marxist debate

The struggle inside the political and intellectual left-wing – between Universal and Particular theories, analysis and demands – repeats itself not only in the struggle between Marxists-socialists and the post-modern, but inside the Marxism itself. It is an older debate that dates from the Karl Korsch being expelled from the communist international

by claims of being a reactionary and revisionist thinker, when he stated the necessity of recurring to Hegel and Kant to develop the materialist dialectics. This sort of debate remains very alive at the debates regarding the profit rate tendential fall and the concept of capital in general.

This debate between Marxists can be divided between two major sides. One center their theories on the class struggle and its fractions, and the specific relationships between the bourgeois dominant fractions and the state. The other one center their analysis at the logical movement of the capital, its own laws, contradictions and aspects of an automatic subject. The first one often attacks and accuses the second for being detached and petit-bourgeois, as the second goes for the first stating that it is neglecting the logical aspects and the Universality of the movements of capital as an automatic subject.

Having all of this in mind, it is possible to say that the main goal of this presentation is to reconcile methodologically these two frames of references. But, being aware of the needs for reconciliation of these radical thoughts and struggles doesn't mean that we are actually being able of doing so.

Writings about Marx's method usually states the needs to go from the simpler and more abstract to the more complex and concrete moments of the concepts or categories. What they usually not tell is how we do it or how we operationalize the dealing with the contradictions. Which gets harder as we go deeper at the specificities of the objects of analysis, because the contradictions grow in number and complexity simultaneously. Specifically, how can we deal with the relations between Universality and Particularity? Or between Unity and Difference? How is one related to the other?

The approach of this presentation is to read the Hegel's science of logic from a Marxist point of view, inspired by the mode of exposition (*darstellung*) of Marx's Capital. More than to read Marx from a Hegelian *locus*, this work is constructed over a Marxist reading of Hegel. It is in our main objectives to initially suggest an operational and anti-dogmatic version of dialectics for critical, scientific and political use of it.

A point of order

In dialectics the recursive feature is pervasive, and everything relates in a reflexive way. Nevertheless, it is still necessary to decide and define a sequence for the exposure process – as words follows words on texts, giving an impression of linearity. Then, it was frequently perceived in the dialectic's history that it is imperative to understand how we should begin exposing and how each concept should follows after another. Hegel wrote extensively about it in his prefaces of doctrine of being and the preface of the phenomenology of the spirit.

At the *Science of Logic*, Hegel began with the being, the pure, abstract, immediate and indeterminate being. And Marx said at his Notes on the Political Economy Treatise of Adolph Wagner that he doesn't starts from the concept, but from the *social forms*. He started his *Capital* with the most apparent and simple one: the commodity as the simplest social form of appearance of the wealth in capitalistic societies.

But, Marx did not fully expose what the social forms are. Neither has any researcher covered by this literature review. In the same way, other fundamental concepts of dialectics (like contradiction) were used in a significant number of different ways. Therefore, before we start this operationalization of the dialectic, we will define what we are calling dialectics and its main terms (like contradiction).

Hegelian dialectics and some Marxist adaptation

Firstly, what it is dialectics? Hegel has pointed out in a conversation with Goethe: "dialectic is the spirit of the organized contradiction". But, as for our needs, it is possible here to redefine the Hegelian definition for the Marxists and political needs. As the starting point of this redefinition, it is interesting to substitute the "spirit" at the Hegelian definition for something that take the material, social and political needs of our times into question.

The status quo of contemporary science neglects the contradictory aspects of reality and violently rejects its use in scientific discourses – as the non-contradiction and the third excluded principles are one of the main basis of the formal logic. In this way, the dialectics is combative with this status quo – by its own constitution being based on contradiction.

As dialectics operates through the contradictory and the negative aspects of things on its main concepts, it is necessarily critic as well, as it exposes conflicts, limits and transformations – for instance. Even though the mentioned critical discipline can bear and be used by a large number of different societal projects (even reactionary and reformist ones), it is, at least, an epistemological project in itself.

The dialectics, as a project for knowledge construction, determines that the contradiction and the non-identical identities (the third that it is excluded from formal logic) are principles for knowability. Consequently, the notion of truth is opposed to the mainstream one. In effect, as the notion of truth carries political consequences, these epistemological projects³ conduct to political consequences and projects, indirectly at least. Therefore, it is possible to define dialectics as a project of *episteme*, truth and, thus, politics.

So, finally, we can define the dialectics as **a project of organizing the contradiction, intellectually and politically**. This project is, necessarily, critical and radical, because it is not possible to talk about the contradictions inside something without going to its roots.

What is, then, a contradiction? Beforehand, it is necessary to go through some explanation of what Hegel constructs at the Doctrine of Essence part of his Science of Logic, where he explains the determinities of reflection, the last one of which is the contradiction.

The essence is more than some element of a factual or inner truth of an epistemic object, is not something that is hidden behind the appearances, away from the non-scientists' sight and from the ideologically compromised ones. The essence is the complex of contradictory relationships that emerge from the matter and the ground (*grund* in German, sometimes translated as fundament), that has a form and exhibits an appearance. Even though it is impossible here to scrutinize the meanings of matter, ground and appearance, what matters here is that, for Hegel, the essence is the organized set of reflexive relationships that occur in a determined object.

Following the Science of Logic, we can define the reflexive relationships (or Reflection, in more general terms) as the relationships of mutually implicating determinities. As the

³ The use of plural here is made to assure that there are various different uses and conceptions of dialectics, even though everyone of them bears their own epistemological project.

determinities, or categories, are the forms that the movement of a given something assumes, has in itself or is supposed to have at a moment of time or thought.

Every time we say that something is equal, or identical, to another something ($A=B$; or $a:=b$) what is done is an judgement of identity, which is a reflexive kind of judgement. In effect, any judgement of identity is reflexive given that some quality of the object **a** (lacanians can be free here, even though that is just a particular case) is projected onto object **b** and said to be there equally. This projection of quality of any **a** onto some **b** is one of the ways by which we talk about reflection in Hegelian sense.

Wherefore, it is possible to say that in every identity there is difference. As identity happens to be a kind of projection of some quality of **a** onto **b**, it necessarily skips other qualities and changes between the two. When we say that a car is a medium of transportation, we create an identity between the car and these media. But, a car is neither a bus nor a plane, which are also a media of transportation, so, in this sense, we have a difference inside an identity.

To approach more debated themes, it is possible to specifically look at this subject in question of gender identities, as an example. Any person that was identified at birth by his family and society as a male and stay his life in accord with this identity is identified as a cis-man. In other terms, he is identified with the cis masculinity. Diversely, if we are aware of Judith Butler's heterosexual matrix and expectations over gender performances, we know that being a cis man usually assumes that this cis man has a lot of different and contradictory traits. Being strong, assertive, aggressive, straight, dominant, enjoyer of cars, sports are some of the clichés for cis masculinity performance.

It is truly impossible, although, that anyone holds all those mainly traits at the same time. Inasmuch, even if one person is identical to its gender for having in itself its identity of gender, it is different from it for not possessing some of its presupposed traits.

The first reflexive determinity is identity, and the second one, in Hegel's sequence, is difference. Hence, for Hegel's Logic in every identity there is difference. Inside of difference we have a simple division. Firstly, it is stated the absolute difference, the one that appear between that is this located, specified difference. In sequence, Hegel postulate the diversity. Which consists of the plurality of differences in a given something and its own categories.

Going back to our example, if we think about the cis male gender as a given thing, there is a collection of different forms of performing it (socially formed ways). Each one of those will be different of the gender in itself. So, inside this identity, of cis man, we have a diversity of different ways of being such a thing.

At Hegel's sequence for the determinities of reflection there is the opposition. Every difference from an object **a** to an object **b** is depictable as a difference from object **a** to object **non-a**; as **b**, being not an **a**, can be called **non-a**. Therefore, the difference passes as an opposition.

In terms of the Hegelian logic, this which is called *passing* (*Übergehen*) is the process by which a category of logical movement, by its own determinations, the internal development of each determinity and its negativity. This can be seen, externally, as if that first category is necessarily expressible in terms of the second one. For instance, in this last case, we can observe the opposition of **a** and **non-a** as a more negative version of the difference between **a** and **b**. However, it must be made clear, that analyzing by the point of view of the differences is not the same that by those of oppositions, even though both may be necessary.

It is possible to say that if in every identity there is difference and, in every difference, lies opposition, hence, in every identity exists opposition. That follows even by a syllogism of the simplest kind, the one that is already presumed by the formal logic.

However, there is a connection between identity and opposition with more significance. There is a *limit* that forms a frontier separating the inside and the outside of a being-in-itself, a something. This *limit* separates the sameness from the otherness. And in this sense, every otherness is not a sameness. Every **b**, **c**, **d** and so on, that are themselves beings-in-themselves, are **non-a**. Difference is a negation of an identity, of a given being-in-itself, in this sense, it negates this given something and opposes it.

Similarly, in every otherness also lies a sameness, as the objects **a**, **b**, **c** and **d** are all objects themselves and identical in their quality of being objects.

There is a type of identities that, lying inside something, makes a movement towards its opposite, negating and destroying the identity. This specific kind of opposition, the one that emerges from the inner determinities of something and negates this something (its

identity), is what we call a contradiction. But, in this case it is important to assert that not every difference or opposition are contradictions.

Recapitulating the cis-male gender example, the strength, virility and hardness that constitutes one of the more stereotypical traits of the cis-masculinity demands a closure of the frailties and existential voids that makes this kind of masculinity fragile. In the same sense that the hardness of a material makes it brittle and, hence, fragile.

The main contradiction, in Marx's *Capital* is the capital-labor contradiction. The capital subsists only by exploring and destroying the labor, but, without the labor it can't exist. The labor-form in the capitalist society, itself, only exists because of the capital, but, to realize itself as labor in the fullest sense of term, it must destroy the capital and, in the way, destroy itself as capitalistic alienated labor.

Therefore, the contradiction is a kind of movement that constantly attracts and repels the inner categories of a given concept. In the given above case, the concept is the capitalistic mode of production, as the capital and labor as some of its internal and contradictory determinities – the most central ones. The contradiction has the capability of destruction and movement creation of the concept it inhabits, the sublation (*aufhebung*) process can occur and build up new forms of appearance of that concept.

Hence, specifically it is only possible to talk about contradiction when the opposing, diversity and difference interacts as if one constructs itself in the other, destroys the other and, in the process, destroys itself. This tense relationship can endure indefinitely, cause the modifications between one-another and each small destruction make up for more cycles of transformation.

This is how contradiction is linked to movement and why the determinations or categories are said to be the *forms of movement*.

The beginning in itself – The social forms

Given the basic forms of movement over which it is possible to pursue the main object of this presentation, it is possible to start to build a dialectical tool box. How, materialistically, can we operationalize the dialectics inside Hegel's logic?

Marx said that he inverted Hegel's logic, putting it back on its feet, but preserving the forms of movement. Jorge Grespan, a Brazilian Economic Historian that writes on method of analyzing history from a materialistic and dialectic point of view, says that the German word that Marx uses for inversion has more the sense of putting a glove from inside out than to put the beginning in the end and vice-versa.

To put a glove inside out we have to take it by the middle part inside and put it visible on the outside. And in the middle of Hegel's logic (and symbolically speaking, it really rests physically in the middle of Science of Logic's books) is the notion of form as what put the essence together.

As Marx begins by the social forms, as told at his Notes to Wagner's Treatise, it is first needed to build what is a form, in a more precise meaning. To Hegel, the forms are the posited determinations of the ground, of the foundation. Besides, the forms are what collect the essence together, what gives it an objectivity, an exterior existence.

Without the form, the ground and the essence cannot appear. There would not exist appearances or the exterior shine that makes an object - an being-in-itself or existence - tangible and visible so that we can make science, have conscience and labor over it.

However, it is necessary to stress that the form is not the same as the appearance. The form is something of a "holding together" order. It posits together, unifies (in a differentiated and contradictory unity) the inner determinities of the ground that gives rise to appearance and shine. As the essence are the determinations of reflections (as expressed above) of the determinities (or categories) of a something.

Additionally, even though Hegel do not say otherwise, to Marx the *form* is necessarily social, and he explicitly stresses this quality. So, the ground to which Marx refers ought to be in the same *spectrum*. The ground, as we can point out in the Marx's uses of *Grund*

in *The Capital*, are the bases of the social relationships, specifically for the capital, the production relationships.

The form is what firstly shows itself to us in the appearance. The first recognizable mediation of appearance. And the latter is the immediate revealing of the determinations of essence through its own social forms. Thus, **the social forms are the process of objectivation of social relationships that stabilizes itself throughout repetition and that can establish social structures** - in a given social context, of previously existent social structures and social forms.

In sequence, each specific trait of the social forms will be individually exposed.

It is fundamental to emphasize that the social forms are processes, that they are neither fixed qualities, *dasein* nor somethings. Instead, the social forms are made of pure contradiction, movement and change. This follows as a result of them being a objectivation of social relations – of the *Grund* – and of the reflexive and *contradictory* determinities of the essence.

The objectivating quality of social forms arises from its being a mechanism of manifestation of the social relations in its wide diversity. Given a form, the social relations base can gain some recurrence, some repetition and some intelligibility. In *forming* an objectivity, the social relations emerges as things, as objectivities. Hence, they are intelligible, observable, recognizable.

This something that emerges with the form can be seen as more or less organized form of what, without the form, could be perceived as a purely diverse experience of contingency. The necessity, in the hegelian sense, demands a mode of intelligibility, of repetition and recurrence.

It is through the process of *formation* that the object may seem to have a life on its own, to work as a concept, as a being-in-itself without immediate reference to the base of social relations that are put together by the form. Thence, the *formed* objectivity carries the quality of a fetish: an appearance of an objectivity that exists independently of its social base.

This objectivity made up for a Unity, in the strong, Hegelian, sense. Inside this unity, as it is composed by the determinations of reflection, lies the identity, the difference, the

diversity, the opposition and the contradiction. Hence, it is a contradictory unity, a unity of the diverse where every identity is a non-identical one. The identity as composed of the non-identical moments and that negates itself.

It is possible to indicate here, even though it cannot be extensively explored, that the social forms can give rise to objectivities with the status of concept and Universality, in a Hegelian sense. Which necessarily encompass the fact that it can be a being-for-itself, that it is, firstly, a being-for-one. The major example of these Universalities and Concepts, in Marxist theory, are the money and the value.

Nevertheless, it needs to be highlighted that in a given social form, the objectivities that they give rise still necessarily relates to the social relationship base in all its forms, even the more contingent ones. Even when a social form objectivate a something that exists as a Concept in Hegelian sense, this concept with its own logical and “automatic” existence, are determined by its social base, at the same pace that they determine it. As everything in dialectics, everything is mutually implicated by a complex net of relationships. This is the sense by which we use here the word reflexive.

The building of a materialistic operationalization of dialectics

Summarizing this presentation, after the rejection of universalities during the period between 1960's and 2008 crisis, it is possible to observe a restoration of its role in critical discourses. For develop this role, it is necessary to reconstruct the dialectical building and emphasize the role of non-identical part of identities, and of the tense relationship between Universality, Particularity, Difference and Unity. How to maintain this tension without pending to a side or the other is a huge challenge which requires rigor and methodological precision.

The next paragraphs are dedicated to the effort of systematize a sequence of methodological procedures for a dialectical grasp of social objects.

Marx's Capital is a work from a mature researcher, activist and author that has considered, throughout his live, multiple sets of intellectual debates, authors, artists and activists. To approach the diversity of diverging analysis (even the vulgar ones) is a necessary step to allow the emergence of the contradictions of reality and appearance in the theoretical analysis.

Given the contradictions of reality expressed in the multiple discourses, analysis, social practices and ideologies, one must organize this complexity without excluding the place that the diversity and contradiction necessarily has in social arrangements. That is the bibliographic review part of every academic research but painted with the colors of complexity and contradiction. Starting from this material, one can try to understand what the most preeminent appearances of the given phenomena are.

Regarding the “how to begin” question, Marx started his *Capital* by saying:

The wealth of those societies in which the capitalist mode of production prevails, presents itself as an immense accumulation of commodities, its unit being a single commodity. Our investigation must therefore begin with the analysis of a commodity. ^[2]

The above exposition of the Wealth is a presentation (*erscheint*) of the essence⁴. Continuing with Marx’s exposition mode (*darstellung*) of the capital on his *Capital*, he postulates the commodity as a form (a social one) of value: the commodity form of value. The forms of value (relative, equivalent, general, expanded, accidental, the money form and so on) gains its characteristics depending on the essentialities⁵ on focus at a determined moment of the analysis.

At each part of an exposition every concept receives its analytical lights on a different set of determinities. At this part of our presentation, the essence is the arrangements of mutual and reflexive relationships between the determinities. Methodologically, the first ones are more abstract and simple – as the accidental form fitting the role of a simpler moment of value. As *Capital*’s mode of exposition goes further, they approximate gradually to the complexity of reality (as the M-C-M’ form of circulation poses the essence of the capital relations).

By the time Marx was questioning about the nature of capitalistic wealth, the commodity was the most outstanding appearance. The appearances are not accidental, they are an important part of the essence and are necessarily connected to the status of social forms amongst themselves.

⁴It is interesting to remark that Marx uses the same concept that Hegel uses to tackle the apparition of the essence: *Erscheinung*.

⁵ Determinations of reflections, or “parts of essence”.

The identification of the social forms and its appearances is the simplest stage of finding the determinations of reflection, namely, the essence. Afterwards, the different identities sorted out may be investigated for their connection between each other, as determinities of a unique non-identical identity, a non-all-encompassing (negative) totality of the diverse. The movement inside this totality, the self-determination of the determinities, the oppositions, the negations, contradictions and sublations should also be investigated.

As this movement of creating an organized knowledge of a complex phenomenon started from the social forms in its appearances towards a logical conceptualization, it ought to come back to the social forms and appearances and contingency. How the general concepts of capitalism and its logical movements relates to the constant transformation of social reality by means of specific social relationships, of the class struggles and changes in structures and superstructures? How they are related to the more solid and already explained totalities of capitalism (as the ones that Karl Marx has explored himself, for instance)? Relations of negativity, derivation, novelty, repetition, identity and contradiction are some of the key determinations that ought to be kept as pervasive tools for the analysis.

This maintaining of the negativity at the same time is focused on the more theoretical and philosophical considerations of Theodor Adorno's Negative Dialectics and some more practical ones derived from Allain Badiou and Jacques Lacan about the "empirical" nature of the negativity as the emanations of the real and the void. These last ones can be seen as affirming the nature of objects not described by the concept or the theoretical logical deductions. The emergencies of contingency, as the direct social relations and class struggles, are a negative space not completely covered by the necessity of the concept.

The considerations of a set of procedures to organize the contradiction included at this conclusion are not far from the commonly repeated maxims of Marxist method (such as from the simple and abstract to the concrete and complex, and back). However, we hope that, given the rest of this presentation, it can be presented in a more practical and rigorous light.